Democratization and real exchange rates by Furlan, Benjamin et al.
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Benjamin Furlan and Martin Gächter and Bob Krebs and Harald Oberhofer
Democratization and real exchange rates
Article (Accepted for Publication)
(Refereed)
Original Citation:
Furlan, Benjamin and Gächter, Martin and Krebs, Bob and Oberhofer, Harald (2016)
Democratization and real exchange rates. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 63 (2). pp. 216-
242. ISSN 1467-9485
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/5691/
Available in ePubWU: August 2017
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
This document is the version accepted for publication and — in case of peer review — incorporates
referee comments.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
 Democratization and real exchange rates∗ 
 Benjamin Furlan† Martin Gächter ‡ Bob Krebs§ Harald Oberhofer¶ 
Abstract 
This paper empirically assesses how democratization affects real exchange rates. By 
doing this, we combine so far separated strands of the economic literature and argue 
that democratization reduces currency undervaluation leading to a real exchange rate 
appreciation. We test this hypothesis empirically for a sample of countries observed 
from 1980 to 2007 by combining a difference-in-difference (DID) approach with 
propensity score matching (PSM) estimators. Our results reveal a strong and significant 
finding: democratization causes real exchange rates to appreciate. Consequently, the 
ongoing process of democratization observed in many parts of the world is likely to 
reduce exchange rate distortions. 
JEL classification: C21, C23, F02, F31, F59, N20. 
Keywords: Real exchange rates, democratization, difference-in-differences-estimator, 
matching estimators. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, an important aspect of trade policy discussions centered around the issue 
of strategic manipulation of exchange rates. WTO trade negotiations prior to the crisis, for 
instance, were accompanied by a lively discussion on whether China systematically 
undervalues its currency in order to establish favorable exchange rates to support its 
export-led growth strategy. These so-called ‘unfair’ exchange rates exercise a direct impact 
on trade, as it can be seen as an export subsidy or import tariff that provides trade 
advantages in contrast to countries with ‘fair’ exchange rates.1 Previous studies on this issue 
primarily focused on economic variables influencing the real exchange rate, such as terms 
of trade, net foreign assets or real interest rates of countries. On the contrary, political and 
institutional characteristics so far only played a minor role in explaining real exchange rate 
movements in the academic literature. This is astonishing because political decision-makers 
are able to directly control the currency of a country by, for instance, following an 
expansionary monetary policy. 
While previous studies do not provide a direct link between democracy and real exchange 
rates, some research considers the role of democracy in promoting free trade. Kono (2006), 
for example, argues that the spread of democracy supports economic development, which 
in turn promotes economic interdependence (Frankel and Romer, 1999). In a similar 
manner, a couple of papers show that democracies trade more than autocracies (e.g., Bliss 
and Russett, 1998), and are more likely to conclude trade agreements (Mansfield et al., 
2002). In fact, the result that democratization promotes trade openness is among the most 
robust in the field of international political economy. 
Surprisingly, however, the impact of democratization on (real) exchange rates has not been 
investigated in the literature. This paper presents a first attempt to investigate whether 
democratization exerts an impact on a country’s real exchange rate. More precisely, we link 
two separated strands of the economic literature, namely the literature on the political 
determinants of trade, portfolio flows or FDI (see, e.g., Li and Resnick, 2003, Yu, 2010) with 
studies that examine the relationship of these latter variables with the (real) exchange rate 
(see, e.g., MacDonald, 1998). As to be explained below, the main reasons for a currency 
appreciation following a democratization may stem both from the current account 
(increased exports and potentially decreased imports) as well as the financial account (as 
democracy is associated with increased FDI and portfolio inflows). An alternative 
explanation for the positive relationship between democratization and changes in exchange 
                                                             
1 The literature usually refers to ‘fair’ exchange rates if the nominal equals the real exchange rate. In other words, 
the exchange rate is assumed to be fair if it is neither under- nor overvalued. 
2 
rates over time could be rooted in the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which implies that faster 
economic growth triggers exchange rate appreciation. Given the large literature on the 
relationship between democracy and real GDP growth (see, among others, Barro, 1996, Heo 
and Tan, 2001, Plumper and Martin, 2003, Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008) which¨ (at 
least partly) shows that democratization induces GDP growth, this catching-up process is 
also likely to induce real exchange rate appreciation. 
In our econometric analysis we combine a difference-in-differences (DID) approach with 
propensity score matching (PSM) estimators. Thereby, the latter allows to overcome both 
the unobserved counterfactual problem and non-random selection into democratization 
while the DID estimator additionally controls for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 
across democratizing and non-democratizing countries. Empirically, we utilize a sample of 
countries observed from 1980 to 2007. 
According to our empirical analysis, the process of democratization indeed leads to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, and thus, reduces misalignments in foreign exchange 
markets. This real exchange rate appreciation is most pronounced in countries that promote 
successive rounds of political changes towards full democracy. Consequently, the recent 
democratization tendencies initiated by the Arab spring in 2011 (and in other parts of the 
world) might induce a change in the international trade patterns by reducing the number of 
countries that strategically undervalue their currencies in order to promote their exports. 
This, of course, will only be a medium- to long-run effect which crucially depends on the 
success of the democratization efforts in the Middle East and other countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
while Section 3 explains the data set and the methodology of our study. Section 4 discusses 
the empirical results. Finally, section 5 draws some conclusions. 
2 Related literature and research question 
There is a broad literature on the determinants of real exchange rates in economics. The 
most common theory in this field of research is based on the idea of ‘purchasing power 
parity’ (PPP) which has been tested quite frequently during the last decades. In short, PPP 
states that the bilateral nominal exchange rate between two countries should be equal to 
their ratio of aggregate price levels, implying that a unit of one country’s currency should 
have the same purchasing power in both countries. Consequently, the real exchange rate 
should be constant over time, leaving currencies neither over- nor undervalued. The PPP 
theory dates back several centuries and became widely recognized after the first world war 
(see Cassel, 1918). 
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Taylor and Taylor (2004) provide a comprehensive overview of the current debate on PPP. 
Accordingly, short-run PPP does not hold but long-run PPP may hold in the sense that most 
studies find significant mean reversion in real exchange rates. More recent papers focus on 
non-linear adjustments (see Sarno and Taylor, 2002) and consider the fact that the 
equilibrium real exchange rate itself may move over time. This might be due to wealth 
effects or the widely recognized Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa, 1964, Samuelson, 
1964). This latter effect can be explained by increased demand for non-traded services in 
relation to traded commodities in countries with higher GDP per capita. In this context, 
Bergstrand (1991) confirms a positive impact of GDP per capita on real exchange rates. 
Other studies primarily focus on the impact of trade-related variables and other 
components of the balance of payments accounts on real exchange rates. For example, 
MacDonald (1998) examines the determinants of real exchange rates by using multivariate 
cointegration methods in a long-run model of equilibrium exchange rates including the 
terms of trade, net foreign assets, fiscal balances and real interest rates as main explanatory 
variables. His findings suggest that factors such as productivity growth or the real price of 
oil affect real exchange rates. In particular, during the oil price shocks in the 1970s and 
1980s, oil-rich countries experienced an appreciation of their currencies relative to oil-
scarce countries. 
Furthermore, a country’s trade balance, tourism and minerals’ share of GDP (see, e.g., 
Clague, 1986) are estimated to be additional structural determinants of real exchange rates. 
This is also confirmed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) who establish a negative long-run 
association between the trade balance and the real exchange rate. Moreover, Faruqee 
(1995) finds that net foreign assets and productivity differentials jointly determine most of 
the variation in real exchange rates. The empirical link between productivity levels and the 
corresponding real exchange rate levels is also confirmed by Candelon et al. (2007). They 
estimate bilateral equilibrium real exchange rates for a group of eight new EU member 
states against the euro and find a negative relation between trade openness and the real 
exchange rate. 
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As can be inferred from the discussion above, previous research has rarely focused on 
political variables, such as democracy or institutional quality when examining the 
determinants of real exchange rates.2 This is insofar astonishing, as the degree of democracy 
has been found to influence policies in similar areas, such as the liberalization of trade (see, 
e.g., Bliss and Russett, 1998). Furthermore, many studies examine the impact of political 
and/or institutional variables on various components of the balance of payments accounts, 
such as trade, portfolio flows or foreign direct investment (FDI). Intuitively, these political 
and institutional characteristics would, therefore, at least indirectly also affect the (real) 
exchange rate. 
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the link between the level of democracy (and 
other political factors) and exchange rates has not been examined so far. For this reason, we 
link two separated strands of the economic literature, namely the literature on political 
determinants of trade, portfolio flows or FDI (see, e.g., Li and Resnick, 2003, Yu, 2010) with 
studies that examine the relationship of these latter variables with the (real) exchange rate 
(see, e.g., MacDonald, 1998). We are thus interested in examining the direct and indirect 
effect of democratization on a country’s real exchange rate. 
From a simplistic theoretical perspective, the nominal exchange rate of a currency is 
determined by the supply of and the demand for the respective currency on world markets. 
When assuming floating exchange rates, the value of a currency will thus be determined by 
money supply and a country’s transactions with the rest of the world, as reported in the 
balance of payment (BOP) accounts. Our line of argumentation thus includes both elements 
from monetary models of exchange rate determination, as well as considerations regarding 
the attainment of balance of payments equilibrium (see, for instance, Mussa, 1984). 
Monetary models regard the exchange rate being determined by the outstanding stocks of 
the two monies and by the demands to hold these stocks. In a further step, the exchange rate 
is also influenced by the expected future paths of money supplies and factors affecting 
money demands. In a balance of payments approach, the exchange rate is in equilibrium 
when the net inflow of foreign exchange arising from current account transactions, i.e. the 
net flow of goods and services, is balanced by the net outflow resulting from financial 
                                                             
2 The papers by Broz (2002) and Bearce and Hallerberg (2011) are notable exceptions, albeit they focus on 
different research questions and nominal exchange rate movements. In particular, these contributions 
examine the relationship between democracy and de facto exchange rate regimes and the stability of 
exchange rates. Due to a monetary preference of the median voter for domestic policy autonomy, Bearce and 
Hallerberg (2011) argue that exchange rates are more volatile in democracies. 
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account transactions, which is determined by the desired excess of domestic income over 
domestic spending. 
Regarding the money supply side, Bagheri and Habibi (1998) are able to show that central 
banks tend to be less independent in autocracies. As the government has to be able to 
influence the central bank’s monetary policy for a currency devaluation, this dependence 
seems to be a necessary condition for competitive devaluations triggered by the 
government. Furthermore, Crowe and Meade (2008) point out that greater central bank 
independence is associated with lower inflation, probably due to slower money supply 
growth in independent central banks. On the contrary, the impact of democratization on 
inflation is empirically ambiguous (see, Desai et al., 2003). In democratic countries inflation 
may be demanded from the public for transfers financed by the inflation tax (which suggests 
that democratic competition will increase inflation), but, on the other hand, inflation may 
also result from pressures of elites who benefit from money creation (which suggests that 
democratic competition will constrain inflation). While Desai et al. (2003) find that 
democracy is associated with lower (higher) inflation in countries with low (high) 
inequality, the effect on the real exchange rate also depends on whether high inflation is 
exactly matched by a corresponding devaluation. Thus, from the money supply perspective, 
there is an ambiguous impact of democratization on money supply and/or real exchange 
rates. Nevertheless, given the empirical evidence for a higher degree of central bank 
independence in more democratic states, and the negative association of the former with 
inflation, we would expect that the demand for the respective currencies might increase 
along with the credibility of the central bank to curb inflation. Moreover, higher central bank 
independence should hamper competitive devaluations, as governments cannot exercise 
any direct influence on money supply, and thus, democratic regimes should be associated 
with ‘fairer’ exchange rates. 
The (net) foreign demand for a currency results from transactions in the BOP, i.e. trade 
transactions (e.g. getting paid for exports or pay for imports, respectively) as well as 
investments in foreign assets (e.g. portfolio and FDI flows across borders). Interestingly, 
most studies find that democratization increases trade. Yu (2010), for example, argues that 
democratization in the exporting country may improve product quality and reduce trade 
costs3, and thus, increases bilateral trade (exports). On the contrary, one might argue that 
democratization in the importing country could increase trade barriers and thus reduce 
                                                             
3  Democratic countries are generally characterized by better institutional quality increasing both the 
commitment to the rule of law and property rights protection which, in turn, allows to establish fair and 
competitive markets (Barro, 1996, Barro, 1999). Intellectual property rights protection might also increase 
R&D expenditures (Clarke, 2001). Finally, an increase in the institutional quality might also lead to more trust 
in a country’s products by the international community (Levchenko, 2007). 
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imports.4 Similarly, Kucera and Sarna (2006) confirm that democratization (and an increase 
in trade union rights) increases total exports, manufacturing exports as well as labor-
intensive manufacturing exports. Thus, economic theory and previous empirical findings 
generally indicate an increase in exports following a wave of democratization, while imports 
might decrease as a result of democratization (although this effect is somehow ambiguous 
and depends on the income level of the corresponding country). From the current account 
(trade balance) perspective, we would thus expect a (nominal and real) currency 
appreciation after a country has experienced a democratization process. 5 Portfolio and 
foreign direct investments are also main determinants of foreign demand for domestic 
currency. As argued by Li and Resnick (2003), democratization and the establishment of 
high quality institutions have an ambiguous effect on FDI inflows. On the one hand, 
democratic institutions impede the possibilities of the government to offer favorable 
conditions for foreign investors. Moreover, in democracies competition policy should be 
able to restrict the monopolistic behavior of (multinational) firms. On the other hand, 
increased transparency, more credible property rights and reduced risks and transactions 
costs in a democratic environment might foster FDI inflows. The empirical analysis for 53 
developing countries by Li and Resnick (2003) shows that the larger FDI inflows in 
democracies are mainly due to increased property rights protection.6 Jensen (2003) obtains 
similar results for a sample of more than 100 countries, finding that democratic countries 
attract about 70 percent more FDI than their authoritarian counterparts. This finding is also 
confirmed by Ahlquist (2006) and challenges the view that multinational firms have a 
preference for authoritarian regimes. In fact, he shows that democratization increases FDI 
inflows, suggesting some appreciation pressure for the currency following the process of 
democratization. The same arguments seem to apply for portfolio investments. Chipalkatti 
et al. (2007) find that emerging capital markets with strong democratic institutions (public 
governance and corporate transparency) attract significantly more portfolio equity flows.7 
Cao and Ward (2013) argue that democratization reduces information asymmetries for 
                                                             
4 Once again, as argued by Yu (2010), this may crucially depend on the income level of the corresponding 
country. While the implications of the Heckscher-Ohlin model would suggest the reduction of tariffs resulting 
from democratization in low-income countries, high-income countries could raise tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to protect domestic labor. 
5 While the current account also includes various other components (e.g. factor income, transfers etc.), the effect 
of democratization on these items has not been examined so far in the literature. Moreover, given available 
data on current accounts worldwide, it is reasonable to assume that the trade balance is the most important 
component of the current account for most countries in our analysis. 
6 In fact, when controlling for the positive effect of property rights protection, democratic institutions appear to 
reduce FDI inflows. However, the overall effect of democratization on FDI inflows is estimated to be positive, 
as the improvement in the protection of property rights is typically associated with a process of 
democratization. 
7 For portfolio bond flows, however, there is no significant link between the presence of democratic institutions 
and increased capital inflows. 
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international investors and are able to confirm the positive impact of democratic 
institutions on inward portfolio investments. They hypothesize that investors use 
democracy as an important information ’short-cut’ for more credible property rights 
protection. Biglaiser et al. (2008) include country ratings of credit rating agencies (CRA) in 
their analysis and find that countries with new political institutions attract more portfolio 
investors because they offer risk premia. Moreover, CRA ratings and democracy have a 
significant positive signalling effect for countries that receive the largest equity inflows. 
Finally, Ahlquist (2006) finds that portfolio investments depend on past government 
behavior and fiscal policy again highlighting the specific role of political institutions for the 
attraction of FDI inflows. In general, our discussion on democratization and capital inflows 
suggests that democratic countries tend to attract both more portfolio and FDI inflows. As 
capital inflows increase the demand for domestic currency, the real exchange rate of a 
democratizing country is therefore likely to appreciate. 
From the discussion of both monetary models and from balance of payments equilibrium 
conditions, we are therefore able to derive the following testable hypothesis for our 
empirical analysis presented below: 
Hypothesis: The establishment of democratic institutions (i.e. democratization) leads 
to an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. 
Once more, the main theoretical arguments for this hypothesis are rooted in the 
appreciation pressure stemming from 
• the well-known Balassa-Samuelson effect, as democratization might induce higher 
real GDP growth (see, among others, Barro, 1996, Heo and Tan, 2001, Papaioannou 
and Siourounis, 2008, Plumper and Martin, 2003), and further, increasing GDP per 
capita is typically associated with real appreciations, 
• the money supply side, as more democratic states tend to exhibit a higher degree of 
central bank independence, which is typically associated with lower inflation rates, 
which increases the credibility of the central bank and potentially also the demand for 
domestic currency by foreigners, 
• the current account (trade balance), i.e. from increased exports due to higher product 
quality and increased trust in products from democratic countries as well as 
decreased imports due to rising tariffs and non-tariff barriers (although the impact on 
imports might be ambiguous, as explained above), and 
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• from the financial account, i.e. that democratic countries attract significantly more FDI 
and portfolio inflows. 
Due to the very complex transmission mechanisms (which are often not directly 
observable), we are unfortunately not able to explicitly distinguish between those various 
transmission channels in our empirical analysis below. Nevertheless, we elaborate on the 
impact of democratization on the individual components of the real exchange rate, i.e. the 
nominal exchange rate and the inflation rate. Furthermore, we also discuss briefly how 
democratization affects money supply growth rates of the respective economies, as this 
might trigger considerable confidence effects leading to further appreciation pressures. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Econometric methodology 
To empirically test our hypothesis, we combine propensity score matching methods with a 
difference-in-difference (DID) estimation framework. The former approach allows to 
account for selection on observables while the latter additionally enables us to control for 
unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity across observations when estimating the 
effect of democratization on the real exchange rate. The problem of estimating this effect is 
a missing data problem (i.e. the counterfactual). Suppose that we observe an indicator 
variable (i.e. treatment variable) which informs whether a country is currently in transition 
to more democracy or not. In such a situation, for each country i at any time t, we can only 
observe one of two potential outcomes (0)ity or 
(1)
ity , where 
(0)
ity (
(1)
ity ) refers to a situation 
without (with) democratization. Formally, the potential outcome yit is then specified as 
 ,)(1= (1)(0) ititititit ydydy   (1) 
where dit equals one if a country is democratizing at the time t and zero otherwise. To 
overcome the missing data problem and self-selection into treatment, we use propensity 
score matching methods. This allows us to extract a relevant control group among the 
nondemocratizing countries in order to produce counterfactual information on the treated 
outcomes had they not been democratized. To estimate each country’s year-specific 
propensity score (i.e., the probability that a country is democratizing) we apply standard 
probit models. Formally, this implies that we estimate the probability of democratization 
p(xit) which is given by 
9 
 ),'(=)( 1,  tiitxp x  (2) 
where Φ denotes the cdf of the normal distribution and xi is a vector of explanatory variables 
measured in t−1 (i.e. prior to democratization). Empirically, we are interested in the average 
treatment effect for the countries which actually experienced democratization (i.e., the 
average treatment effect on the treated or ATT). Another (econometric) reason for the 
estimation of the ATT is that it provides a consistent treatment effect estimate for non-
randomized treatments (Blundell and Dias, 2009). This, in turn, is likely to be the case for 
democratization of countries. Formally, the ATT can be expressed as follows 
(see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2010) 
 1).=|(= (0)(1) ititit dyyEATT   (3) 
In a next step, we formulate the DID estimator which is based on the differences between 
?̃?𝑖𝑡
(1)
=  𝑦𝑖𝑡
(1)
− 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
(1)
 and ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(0)
=  𝑦𝑖𝑡
(0)
− 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
(0)
 and rewrite the ATT for our propensity score 
approach. Thereby, the actual treatment status is simply replaced by each country’s 
propensity score yielding 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = [𝑦𝑖𝑡
(1)|𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1, 𝑝(𝑥𝑖𝑡)] − 𝐸 [𝑦𝑖𝑡
(0)|𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝑝(𝑥𝑖𝑡)] = 𝐸 [?̃?𝑖𝑡
(1) − ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(0)|𝑝(𝑥𝑖𝑡)]. (4) 
Intuitively, equation (4) states that the average democratization effect for the group of 
democratizing countries is given by the expected DID in the real effective exchange rates 
(REERs) for treated and non-treated countries with the same (or most similar) propensity 
score p(xit).8 In this regard propensity score matching methods solve the problem of the 
non-observable counterfactual outcome by constructing a control group consisting of non-
democratizing countries with a similar democratization probability as the actually 
democratized countries. Moreover, the DID estimator allows to control for unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity across the groups of treated and non-treated countries by 
comparing changes in the outcome variable over time. 
In order to determine which observations enter the control group, we need to define the 
proximity between the propensity scores of the treated and their controls. Further we can 
attribute weights to the selected observations in the comparison group. In this paper, we 
apply various different matching methods such as one, three and five nearest neighbor 
matching as well as kernel matching. Thereby, in the former three procedures for each 
democratizing country the control group consists of one, three or five non-democratizing 
                                                             
8 A more detailed disscussion on why we utilize the real effective exchange rates as our outcome variables is 
provided below. The main reason, however, lies in our econometric approach that requires an outcome 
variables that is not sensitive to the democratization status of other countries. 
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countries with the most similar democratization probabilities, respectively. Kernel 
matching procedures calculate weighted averages of the changes in REERs for all non-
democratizing countries and compare each democratizing country with the respective 
weighted average from the control group (Heckman et al., 1997, Smith and Todd, 2005). The 
weights of the control group countries depend on their distances in propensity scores to 
each democratized country, respectively. 
The estimation of the average treatment effect requires the following assumptions to hold: 
The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) states that the treatment of unit i only 
affects the outcome of i (see, Wooldridge, 2010). This implies that the democratization of 
one country should not affect the real exchange rate of a non-treated country. 
For this reason, we utilize the real effective exchange rate (REER) index as reported in the 
World Bank World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2011). This effective 
exchange rate is based on a (constant) set of foreign currencies consisting of the most traded 
ones (such as e.g., Euro, Dollar and Yen). This, in turn, implies that no single local currency 
of a democratized country is used for the calculation of the exchange rate for non-
democratized controls and the SUTVA holds by construction. 
Furthermore, we also need the common support assumption stating that all democratizing 
countries have a counterpart in the non-treated population. The balancing property 
requires that democratized countries and matched controls with the same propensity 
scores exhibit the same distribution with regard to their observable characteristics.9 Finally, 
for the DID approach we need the common trend assumption which states that changes in 
REERs for both groups generally follow a common trend and deviations from this trend are 
only due to differences in the democratization status. 
To sum up, we hypothesize that democratization has a positive impact on a country’s real 
effective exchange rate which corresponds to a positive estimated ATT. The following 
section presents the data for our analysis, describes the specification of the propensity score 
equation and offers some first descriptive insights. 
3.2 Data, propensity score equation and descriptive statistics 
The treatment in our study constitutes a significant change towards democracy. In order to 
define democratization, we use data from the Polity IV Project (Integrated Network for 
Societal Conflict Research, see INSCR, 2009). More precisely, our democratization measure 
                                                             
9 This assumption can be verified with a test proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). In the Appendix, we 
report some balancing property tests which commonly point to a considerable bias reduction indicating that 
the difference between both country types is reduced substantially after matching. 
11 
is based on the polity 2 index, which is a combined score ranging from -10 to +10, where 
larger values indicate a higher level of democracy. 10  In our baseline specification, the 
treatment variable democratization takes on the value of one if a country accumulates an 
increase in its polity 2 index by at least three points over a time frame of three 
years.11Moreover, in order to carry out DID-estimations, we define time windows of five 
years pre- and post-democratization, and thus, focus on medium-term REER adjustments. 
More precisely, we compare the mean of the REER for the 5 years before as well as for the 
5 years following the treatment (i.e. democratization). For the available sample period from 
1980 to 2007, this implies that we are able to only consider democratization processes that 
are observable from 1985 to 2002 leaving us with 128 democratizations. 
As already discussed above, the real effective exchange rate (REER) index provided by the 
International Financial Statistics is used to compile the outcome variable. The REER is 
defined as the nominal effective exchange rate divided by a price deflator. Thereby, the 
nominal effective exchange rate is calculated as the (relative) value of a currency against a 
weighted average of the most traded foreign currencies (The World Bank, 2011). 
Consequently, an increase in the REER implies a real exchange rate appreciation. 
Applying our baseline definition of democratization, Figure 1 graphically displays the REER 
and the polity 2 score for all 31 countries that experienced at least one democratization 
event between 1985 and 2002. From this figure, it can already be inferred that there is a 
considerable co-movement between a country’s REER and its polity 2 score in most of the 
cases. We observe that currencies tend to appreciate in real terms after a democratization 
event took place (see, e.g., Chile 1989; Bulgaria 1990 and Armenia 1998) while 
autocratization tendencies seem to be accompanied by depreciation of the local currencies 
(see, e.g., Uganda 1986; Zambia 1996; Sierra Leone 1997 and Ivory Coast 2002). In this 
context, Nigeria can serve as a textbook example, where the drop in the polity score from 
+7 to -6 during the military junta government, which was in power from 1983 to 1998, was 
accompanied by a significant exchange rate depreciation. At the end of the military era in 
1998 President Abdulsalami Abubakar encouraged a democratization process causing an 
increase in both the polity score index and the REER. On the contrary, Uruguay shows a 
slightly different picture as the process of democratization started in 1983 after the civilian-
                                                             
10 The variable polity 2 is a combined index composed of the two variables democ and autoc that measure 
mainly three elements: (i) electoral freedom, (ii) existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of 
power by the executive and (iii) guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives. A value of +10 
indicates perfect democracy, whereas -10 states that a country is fully autocratic. 
11 In our robustness analysis we utilize alternative definitions of democratization. In particular, we vary the 
number of accumulated changes in the polity 2 index between only one and four points over the three year 
time period and utilize alternative data sources for democratizations. 
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military regime from a polity score of -7 and reached the value of full democracy (+10) in 
1989. Again, the exchange rate followed democratization with only a short delay. 
In order to estimate the impact of democratization on REERs, we first have to specify the 
propensity score model which explains a country’s democratization probability.12 For that, 
we follow the related literature on the determinants of democratization. To start with, our 
model contains each country’s initial polity 2 score (measured in 1980) as well as its 
respective score at the time of democratization (see, e.g., Barro ,1999, Papaioannou and 
Siourounis, 2008). Here, one might expect that initially already (relatively) democratized 
countries are less likely to experience further democratization. On the contrary, the relevant 
literature on democratization assumes that some institutional preconditions are necessary 
in order to enforce successful democratization. This, in turn, would imply that 
                                                             
12 According to Blundel and Dias (2009), the appropriate matching variables should both describe the available 
information at the time of the treatment and simultaneously explain the outcome variable. 
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countries with a larger polity 2 index value at the time of democratization are more likely 
to exhibit sustainable democratization processes. 
A country’s nominal GDP per capita measured in 1975 (which is again taken from World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators) enters our selection equation as a further control 
(see, e.g., Muller, 1995, Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). Here, we argue that the 
probability for a coup d’état is a negative function of a country’s economic welfare, implying 
that democratization tendencies are more likely to be observed in poorer countries. Related 
to this discussion, one might additionally argue that, due to large rents associated with 
exports of natural resources, some dictators have been better able to retain non-democratic 
governmental structures (see, e.g., Barro, 1999). In particular, as demonstrated by Crespo 
Cuaresma et al. (2011) among others, autocratic leaders which govern oil-rich countries 
exhibit a significantly increased dictatorship duration. Consequently, our empirical 
specification contains information on oil production (measured in terms of 1,000 barrels 
per day) combined with an indicator variable capturing a country’s oil exporter status as 
well as an interaction term between these two. The respective information is provided by 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that a change in political leadership is often followed 
by democratization processes. Thereby, a leadership change can either be caused by natural 
deaths of the respective (former) leaders (see, e.g., Spain after the death of Francisco Franco 
in 1975 or President Abdulsalami Abubakar democratic reforms in Nigeria after the 
mysterious death of his predecessor Sani Abacha) or by coup d’états (see, e.g., Romania’s 
democratization after the assassination of Nicolae Ceausescu during the Romanian 
Revolution of 1989). For this reason, utilizing data from the Archigos database which is 
provided by Goemans et al. (2007), we construct a dummy variable for a change in political 
leadership. Finally, our selection equation also comprises a full set of time- and continent 
fixed effects in order to control for democratization waves across time and regions, 
respectively. 
Table 1 reports simple summary statistics for the variables of main interest where ∆REER 
refers to changes in the REER between a time period capturing five years prior and five 
years post democratization. When comparing democratized countries with their non-
democratized counterparts some interesting insights can be obtained. First, the currencies 
of democratizing countries more strongly appreciated as indicated by an average increase 
of 7 percentage points. Second, democratizing countries are initially less democratic and 
poorer as measured in terms of GDP per capita in 1975. Interestingly, however, the pre-
democratization polity 2 index of democratizing countries is substantially higher in 
comparison to its initial value in 1980. This, in turn, suggests that a country needs to pass a 
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certain institutional threshold before it is able to experience a real boost in 
democratization.13 Finally, democratizing countries tend to produce less oil which, however, 
is more likely to be exported to foreign markets while approximately 28 percent of all 
democratizations are initiated by a change in the political leadership. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Democratizing countries    
∆ REER 128 0.070 0.269 -0.174 -1.719 
Polity 2 (1980) 128 −5.031 5.026 -9 7 
Polity 2 128 3.156 4.720 -6 10 
log GDP per capita (1975) 128 6.888 1.235 4.645 9.014 
log Oil production 128 1.829 2.304 0 7.722 
Oil exporter status 128 0.102 0.303 0 1 
log Oil production * exporter status 128 0.705 2.120 0 7.722 
Leader Change 128 0.281 0.451 0 1 
Non-democratizing countries    
∆ REER 1,000 0.022 0.128 -0.194 2.252 
Polity 2 (1980) 1,000 2.225 7.978 -9 10 
Polity 2 1,000 4.645 6.853 -9 10 
log GDP per capita (1975) 1,000 8.104 1.644 4.645 10.505 
log Oil production 1,000 2.624 2.808 0 9.102 
Oil exporter status 1,000 0.059 0.236 0 1 
log Oil production * exporter status 1,000 0.362 1.470 0 7.665 
Leader Change 1,000 0.184 0.388 0 1 
4 Estimation results 
4.1 Selection equation 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for our selection equation explaining a country’s 
democratizing probability. Note again, that a democratization event is defined as a 
minimum increase of three points in a country’s polity 2 index observed over a time period 
of three years. The first column refers to our baseline specification including the full sample 
of democratizing and non-democratizing countries while the remaining three columns offer 
                                                             
13  Intuitively, this effect might resemble the well known poverty trap conundrum in the economic growth 
literature. Empirical studies show considerable convergence among countries in economic development, 
whereas countries with a very low level of prosperity tend to remain in their poverty trap. Similarly, we could 
define a democracy trap where a certain level of democratic institutions are a prerequisite for further 
progress in democratization efforts. 
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a first robustness analysis for various sub-samples of countries.14 In particular, in column 2 
we exclude all non-sustainable democratization events while in columns 3 and 4 we 
distinguish between consecutive and non-consecutive democratizations, respectively. 
Thereby, non-sustainable democratizations refer to situations where the increase in the 
polity 2 index is followed by a decrease in the index during the consecutive three years. 
Similarly, we identify consecutive democratizations as cases where one democratization 
process is immediately followed by further democratization.15  This distinction between 
consecutive and non-consecutive democratizations, later on, allows to assess whether a 
country’s exchange rate is differently affected by short-run or medium-run democratization 
strategies. 
The parameter estimates depicted in Table 2 are by and large in line with our discussion 
from above and the related literature on the key determinants of democratization. First, less 
democratized countries are more likely to experience democratization. This is indicated by 
negative and significant parameter estimates associated with the initial polity 2 scores 
measured in 1980. Contrary, conditional on this former effect, countries with a higher actual 
pre-democratization polity 2 index are more likely to democratize. This supports the view 
that there are certain institutional pre-conditions which foster successful democratization. 
Second, the significantly negative initial GDP per capita estimates point to the importance 
of economic conditions for democratization. Correspondingly, economically well-endowed 
autocratic states are less likely to experience democratization. Moreover, with regard to the 
impact of crude oil on a country’s democratization probability we obtain interesting results. 
Oil production per se has no significant impact on the propensity to experience any 
democratization while oil exporting countries are significantly less likely to democratize. 
This latter effect, however, diminishes with an increase in oil production. Intuitively, this 
suggests that oil exports might allow autocratic leaders to maintain their non-democratic 
regimes while increasing dependence on these oil trades offsets this effect. 
Finally, a change in political leadership tends to be associated with the initiation of 
democratization events as indicated by the positive and significant parameter estimate for 
the full sample. This effect, however, is mainly observable for countries which experience 
consecutive democratization, while a change at the head of the state seems to reduce the 
probability of a non-consecutive democratization. Summing up this last result, we are able 
                                                             
14 Table A.1 provides a list of a all democratizing countries including the year of democratization and the sub-
sample assignments. 
15 In this context, it is worth noting that for consecutive democratizations we allow the three years time periods 
to overlap each other. 
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to infer that leadership changes positively affect the probability of consecutive 
democratization efforts. 
Table 2: Estimation results for the selection equation (democratization probability) 
Variable Full Exluding non Consecutive Non-consecutive 
 sample sustainable democratization democratization 
Polity 2 (1980) -0.064*** -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.054*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) 
Polity 2 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.103*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.027) 
GDP per capita (1975) -0.163** -0.226*** -0.211** -0.277** 
 (0.079) (0.084) (0.094) (0.135) 
Oil production -0.011 -0.020 -0.015 -0.051 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.049) (0.075) 
Oil exporter status -3.348** -3.313** -3.511* -3.084 
 (1.645) (1.644) (1.907) (2.628) 
Oil production * exporter status 0.625*** 0.637*** 0.669** 0.640 
 (0.244) (0.247) (0.286) (0.396) 
Leader change 0.325** 0.204 0.442** -0.669** 
 (0.153) (0.164) (0.176) (0.342) 
Time effects 𝛼  41.95*** 41.95*** 38.33*** 24.65* 
Regional effects
𝛽
 27.91*** 28.53*** 114.62*** 8.85 
McFadden´s-R² 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.34 
Observations 1,128 1,059 1,029 868 
Notes: Parameter estimates are reported. The dependent variable democratization equals one if a country increases its polity 2 index by a 
minimum of 3 points over a time period of 3 years and zero otherwise. Parameter estimates of the constant are not reported. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Tests𝛼  for joint significance are based on F-tests with 
17, 17, 17 and 15 degrees of freedom, respectively. Tests
𝛽
 for joint significance are based on chi²-tests with 6 degrees of freedom. 
 
The overall quality of our selection equation is crucial for obtaining reasonable matching 
results. The reported McFadden’s-R2 measures for all four samples indicate a satisfactory 
model specification.16 Consequently, the estimation outcomes of the just described selection 
                                                             
16 For robustness purposes, we added further control variables to our selection equation to control for standard 
macroeconomic variables (inflation, unemployment rate, and GDP). All variables turned out to be 
insignificant in our selection equation. Furthermore, the estimated effect of democratization on the REER 
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equations allow us to predict propensity scores for both democratizing and non-
democratizing countries. Subsequently, these predications are used for the construction of 
the control group of non-democratized countries. Hereby, it is crucial that the above 
described common support restriction is imposed and that the balancing property is 
fulfilled. The former is needed to ensure that all democratizing countries have a relevant 
counterpart in the non-treated population. 
With regard to the latter, Table A.2 in the appendix reports balancing property tests for the 
baseline model with all observations and for three nearest neighbor matching.17 
Evidently, after matching, both groups of countries (the democratizing ones and their non-
democratizing matched counterparts) do not significantly differ with regard to their 
covariates. Consequently, especially for the full sample of all countries the matching 
procedure induces a considerable bias reduction.18 This implies that observations with the 
same propensity score have the same distribution of their observable characteristics. Thus, 
exposure to the treatment is now exogenous (given the included observable characteristics) 
and the treated and control countries are on average identical. 
4.2 Baseline results 
Table 3 reports various ATTs applying our baseline definition of democratization for the full 
sample of all countries as well as for the three above discussed sub-samples. Thereby, we 
separately report results based on the four alternative matching procedures discussed 
above, namely one, three and five nearest neighbor matching and kernel matching.19 As 
hypothesized, Table 3 indicates that democratization exerts a positive impact on a country’s 
REER. More specifically, focusing on the full sample of all democratizations, our estimated 
ATTs range from 0.058 to 0.062 and are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This 
indicates that democratizing countries increase their REERs by approximately 6 percentage 
                                                             
(when using this alternative specification) was qualitatively unchanged as compared to the specification with 
less explanatory variables. 
17  For the sake of brevity, we do not report the balancing property statistics for the alternative matching 
techniques as well as for our three alternative sub-samples. However, the outcomes of the respective tests 
are strikingly similar to Table A.2 and are available from the authors upon request. 
18 Note, that for our sub-samples of consecutive and non-consecutive democratizations we observe a negative 
bias reduction for the oil exporting indicator and the interaction effect between oil production and oil 
exporting, respectively. Here, both groups of non-democratizing and democratizing countries do not differ in 
their characteristics already before matching and, thus, the matching procedure does not lead to further 
improvements in homogenizing both groups of countries. 
19 The common support restriction is not fulfilled for three (one) democratization observation in the full sample 
(‘excluding non sustainable’ subsample). These observations refer to Lesoto in 1993 and 1994, Malawi in 
1994 and Lesoto in 1993, respectively. 
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points in comparison to a counterfactual situation where these countries would have not 
experienced any democratization. In a similar vein, with the exception of one-to-one nearest 
neighbor matching we obtain significant ATTs of a similar magnitude for the sub-sample 
which excludes all non-sustainable democratizations. For the group of consecutively 
democratizing countries the impact of democratizations on a country’s monetary policy is 
further increased indicating that the average appreciation of REERs is around 7 percentage 
points larger than for their non-democratizing controls. On the contrary, when only focusing 
on non-consecutive democratizations, we are not able to estimate significant 
democratization effects for REERs. This implies that democratization has to be experienced 
consecutively in order to affect a country’s exchange rate policy. Due to the small number of 
only 34 observed democratizations in this last sub-sample, this result, however, should be 
interpreted cautiously. 
In terms of the quantitative magnitude, the effect of democratization on a country’s REER is 
sizable and significant. Table 1 indicates that the unconditional rate of appreciation over the 
5 years window amounts to 7 percent in democratizing countries. The ATT estimates 
indicate that this rate would be lower by approximately 6 percentage points in a 
hypothetical situation without any democratization. Accordingly, about 85 percent (6 out of 
7 percent) of the overall appreciation in democratizing countries can be causally attributed 
to the democratization process. To put it more informally, without these democratizations, 
the respective countries would not have experienced any real exchange rate appreciation at 
all. 
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Table 3: Baseline results for real effective exchange rates (REERs) 
 ATT Std. Err. 
Full sample   
Nearest Neighbour 0.061** (0.028) 
Neighbour 3 0.062** (0.026) 
Neighbour 5 0.059** (0.026) 
Kernel 0.058** (0.026) 
Excluding non sustainable   
Nearest Neighbour 0.048 (0.032) 
Neighbour 3 0.051* (0.030) 
Neighbour 5 0.055* (0.030) 
Kernel 0.060** (0.029) 
Consecutive democratization   
Nearest Neighbour 0.068* (0.036) 
Neighbour 3 0.075** (0.034) 
Neighbour 5 0.073** (0.033) 
Kernel 0.064* (0.033) 
Non-consecutive democratization   
Nearest Neighbour 0.040 (0.062) 
Neighbour 3 0.049 (0.060) 
Neighbour 5 0.044 (0.059) 
Kernel 0.044 (0.059) 
Notes: The dependent variable democratization equals one if a country 
increases its polity 2 index by a minimum of 3 points over a time period 
of 3 years and zero otherwise. Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 
replications reported. *,** ,*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
While we are not able to distinguish between various transmission channels, we extended 
our analysis to individual components affecting the real exchange rate.20 In particular, if we 
repeat our estimations for the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) instead of the REER, 
the results confirm our conclusions from our analysis above. More precisely, the treatment 
(i.e. democratization) leads to a statistically significant appreciation of the NEER of 
approximately 5 percent for consecutive waves of democratization (the effect is slightly 
smaller for the full sample, but still statistically significant). On the contrary, while the 
estimations show a negative impact of democratization on inflation rates, this effect is not 
statistically significant. In a similar vein, our results show that democratization is negatively 
associated with money supply growth, but the effect is not statistically significant. These 
findings let us to conclude that the democratization induced real exchange rate appreciation 
is mainly driven by its effect on the nominal exchange rate, which, in turn, is most likely due 
to increased foreign demand for domestic currency both for trade (current account) and 
                                                             
20 The following results are not shown below, but available from the authors upon request. 
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financing (financial account) purposes. In this regard, a higher degree of central bank 
independence associated with democratization might also lead to an anticipation of lower 
money supply growth in the future, and thus, to higher demand for domestic currency by 
foreigners. 
4.3 Robustness checks 
The matching results discussed above rely on only one potential definition of 
democratization. For this reason, we offer a comprehensive sensitivity analysis where we 
apply three alternative possible definitions. In particular, the upper part of Table 4 reports 
ATT estimates where a country is classified to experience a democratization if the polity 2 
index increases by only one point during three years. This obviously inflates the number of 
treatments in our sample and, thus, leads to statistically weaker results. Most importantly, 
applying kernel matching methods for the four different samples of countries, we obtain 
qualitatively similar results and democratization positively and significantly affects a 
country’s REER. Quantitatively, the effect amounts to approximately 4.5 percentage points 
additional appreciation and again seems to be driven by consecutive democratization. 
On the contrary, the second alternative definition of democratization is more restrictive. In 
this robustness analysis a country experiences democratization if the polity 2 score 
increases by (at least) four points during three years. With regard to this sensitivity analysis 
the corresponding ATT estimates once more point to the robustness of our baseline results. 
Focusing on the full sample, we again obtain significant estimates for all four alternative 
matching procedures, with an increase in real appreciation ranging from 6.8 to 7.8 
percentage points. The results for the three sub-samples are slightly less significant which 
is due to the substantial reduction of democratizing countries. 
In a further step, we decompose our treatment variable polity 2 and use the variable democ 
of the Polity IV data set. This variable uses a more narrow definition of 
democratization21and is defined from values 0 to 10. As can be seen in our third robustness 
analysis, the effect of democratization (increase of at least one point during three years) on 
the REER is smaller than in our baseline model, but still statistically significant. Finally, we 
define an alternative measure of democratization using data from Cheibub et al. (2010). This 
  
                                                             
21  This measure only focuses on three specific dimensions of a democratic system which includes the 
competitiveness of political participation, the process of executive recruitment and the constraints on the 
(maybe elected) chief executives. In this regard, the variable democ captures the minimum required 
institutional arrangements necessary for a pluralistic system. 
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Table 4: Robustness analysis for alternative definitions of democratization 
 Full Excluding non Consecutive Non-consecutive 
 sample sustainable democratization democratization 
Robustness 1: One point increase in polity 2 during three years  
Nearest Neighbour 0.032* 0.051** 0.046** 0.005 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.036) 
Nearest Neighbour 3 0.027 0.048** 0.047** 0.024 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.032) 
Nearest Neighbour 5 0.032* 0.046** 0.042** 0.027 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.032) 
Kernel 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.037 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.031) 
Robustness 2: Four points increase in polity 2 during three years  
Nearest Neighbour 0.078** 0.092** 0.066 0.057 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.044) (0.069) 
Nearest Neighbour 3 0.068** 0.076* 0.078* 0.070 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.043) (0.067) 
Nearest Neighbour 5 0.070** 0.076** 0.077** 0.070 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.042) (0.066) 
     
Kernel 0.069** 0.076** 0.075* 0.071 
 (0.031) (0.038) (0.043) (0.067) 
Robustness 3: One point increase in democ during three years 
Nearest Neighbour 0.017 0.015 0.031** −0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) 
Nearest Neighbour 3 0.020** 0.017* 0.027** −0.002 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
Nearest Neighbour 5 0.021** 0.017* 0.027** 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) 
Kernel 0.018** 0.019** 0.023** −0.001 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
Robustness 4: Alternative democratization classification, Cheibub et al. (2010)  
Nearest Neighbour 
0.084 - - - 
(0.056) - - - 
Nearest Neighbour 3 0.092* - - - 
(0.055) - - - 
Nearest Neighbour 5 0.090* - - - 
(0.055) - - - 
Kernel 0.090* - - - 
(0.054) - - - 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications reported. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. 
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dataset includes information on a country’s governmental system distinguishing between 
royal dictatorships, military dictatorships, civilian dictatorships, presidential democracies, 
semi-presidential democracies and parliamentary democracies. We define democratization 
as a change from one of the former three political systems to any type of democracy. With 
this data at hand we are able to identify 54 democratizations, but are not able to distinguish 
between sustainable and consecutive democratizations. For this reason, we only report 
results for the full sample of all treatments. Table 4 documents that our results are robust 
against this alternative definition of democratization. Accordingly, democratizations are 
indicated to increase a country’s REER by 8.4 to 9.2 additional percentage points. The 
statistical significance of the ATT estimation results, however, is somewhat weaker. 
To sum up, our results suggest that democratization processes, mostly observed in 
developing and emerging countries, are accompanied by a significant appreciation of the 
corresponding currency in real terms. Furthermore, the effect is of considerable magnitude, 
as the democratization effect leads to an additional appreciation of approximately 6 
percentage points which would not be observed without democratization. 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of democratization on real effective exchange rates. In 
particular, we argue that democratization leads to a boost in exports, while the effect on 
imports is less clear from a theoretical perspective. Furthermore, democracies are able to 
attract significantly more portfolio inflows as well as inward FDI, which exerts certain 
appreciation pressures following the establishment of democratic institutions. Due to 
increased central bank independence in democracies, money supply growth is also likely to 
be lower, although this effect of democratization is not entirely unambiguous. Focusing on 
the balance of payment accounts, however, it seems likely that the demand for currency 
increases following democratizing developments and, thus, real exchange rates are 
hypothesized to increase. 
As hypothesized, our empirical results suggest that the process of democratization leads to 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and thus, reduces misalignments in foreign 
exchange markets. This real exchange rate appreciation is most pronounced in countries 
that promote successive rounds of political changes towards full democracy. The recent 
democratization tendencies initiated by the Arab spring in 2011 might therefore change 
international trade by reducing the number of countries which strategically undervalue 
their currencies in order to promote their exports. This, of course, will only be a medium to 
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long-run effect which crucially depends on the success of the democratization efforts in the 
respective countries. 
Our study leaves several doors open for future research. First, an alternative test for our 
hypothesis could be to investigate whether autocratization induces exchange rate 
depreciations. 22  Second, another interesting research question could involve the 
relationship between real exchange rate stability and democracy. This is insofar of special 
interest, as stability in real exchange rates reduces incentives for competitive devaluations 
and beggar-thy-neighbour policies, and thus, would likely reduce the turmoil in world 
financial markets. Overall, the role of political variables for the competitiveness of countries 
in general and for real exchange rates in particular should attract more interest in the 
economic literature in order to more fully understand alternative transmission mechanisms 
of macroeconomic shocks. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: List of Treatment Groups 
Country Code Year Sample 
Armenia ARM 1999 consecutive 
Armenia ARM 2000 non-consecutive 
Burundi BDI 1992 consecutive, non-consecutive 
Burundi BDI 1993 non-sustainable 
Burundi BDI 1994 non-sustainable 
Burundi BDI 1995 non-sustainable 
Burundi BDI 1999 consecutive 
Burundi BDI 2000 non-consecutive 
Burundi BDI 2002 consecutive 
Bulgaria BGR 1992 non-consecutive 
Central African Republic CAF 1993 consecutive 
Central African Republic CAF 1994 consecutive 
Central African Republic CAF 1995 non-consecutive 
Chile CHL 1988 consecutive 
Chile CHL 1989 consecutive 
Chile CHL 1990 consecutive 
Chile CHL 1991 non-consecutive 
Ivory Coast CIV 1999 non-sustainable 
Ivory Coast CIV 2000 non-sustainable 
Ivory Coast CIV 2001 non-sustainable 
Cameroon CMR 1992 consecutive 
Cameroon CMR 1993 consecutive 
Cameroon CMR 1994 non-consecutive 
Czech Republic CZE 1993 consecutive 
Czech Republic CZE 1994 consecutive 
Czech Republic CZE 1995 non-consecutive 
Dominican Republic DOM 1997 consecutive 
Dominican Republic DOM 1998 non-consecutive 
Algeria DZA 1989 non-sustainable 
Algeria DZA 1990 non-sustainable 
Algeria DZA 1991 non-sustainable 
Algeria DZA 1995 consecutive 
Algeria DZA 1996 consecutive 
Algeria DZA 1997 non-consecutive 
Ethiopia ETH 1991 consecutive 
Ethiopia ETH 1992 consecutive 
Ethiopia ETH 1993 non-consecutive 
Gabon GAB 1990 consecutive 
Gabon GAB 1991 consecutive 
Gabon GAB 1992 non-consecutive 
Ghana GHA 1991 consecutive 
Continued on next page 
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Ghana GHA 1992 consecutive 
Ghana GHA 1993 consecutive 
Ghana GHA 1994 non-consecutive 
Ghana GHA 1996 consecutive 
Ghana GHA 1997 consecutive 
Ghana GHA 1998 non-consecutive 
Ghana GHA 2001 consecutive 
Ghana GHA 2002 consecutive 
Guyana GUY 1992 consecutive 
Guyana GUY 1993 consecutive 
Guyana GUY 1994 non-consecutive 
Croatia HRV 1992 non-sustainable 
Croatia HRV 1993 non-sustainable 
Croatia HRV 1999 consecutive 
Croatia HRV 2000 consecutive 
Croatia HRV 2001 consecutive 
Croatia HRV 2002 non-consecutive 
Hungary HUN 1988 consecutive 
Hungary HUN 1989 consecutive 
Hungary HUN 1990 consecutive 
Hungary HUN 1991 consecutive 
Hungary HUN 1992 non-consecutive 
Lesotho a b LSO 1993 consecutive 
Lesotho a LSO 1994 consecutive 
Lesotho LSO 1995 non-sustainable 
Lesotho LSO 2001 consecutive 
Lesotho LSO 2002 consecutive 
Malawi a MWI 1994 consecutive 
Malawi MWI 1995 consecutive 
Malawi MWI 1996 non-consecutive 
Nigeria NGA 1998 consecutive 
Nigeria NGA 1999 consecutive 
Nigeria NGA 2000 consecutive 
Nigeria NGA 2001 non-consecutive 
Nicaragua NIC 1985 consecutive 
Nicaragua NIC 1986 non-consecutive 
Nicaragua NIC 1990 consecutive 
Nicaragua NIC 1991 consecutive 
Nicaragua NIC 1992 non-consecutive 
Pakistan PAK 1985 consecutive 
Pakistan PAK 1986 consecutive 
Pakistan PAK 1987 consecutive 
Pakistan PAK 1988 consecutive 
Pakistan PAK 1989 consecutive 
Pakistan PAK 1990 non-consecutive 
Continued on next page 
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Philippines PHL 1986 consecutive 
Philippines PHL 1987 consecutive 
Philippines PHL 1988 consecutive 
Philippines PHL 1989 non-consecutive 
Poland POL 1989 consecutive 
Poland POL 1990 consecutive 
Poland POL 1991 consecutive 
Poland POL 1992 consecutive 
Poland POL 1993 non-consecutive 
Paraguay PRY 1989 consecutive 
Paraguay PRY 1990 consecutive 
Paraguay PRY 1991 consecutive 
Paraguay PRY 1992 consecutive 
Paraguay PRY 1993 consecutive 
Paraguay PRY 1994 consecutive, non-consecutive 
Sierra Leone SLE 1996 non-sustainable 
Sierra Leone SLE 1997 consecutive 
Sierra Leone SLE 1998 non-consecutive 
Sierra Leone SLE 2002 consecutive 
Slovakia SVK 1993 consecutive 
Slovakia SVK 1994 consecutive 
Slovakia SVK 1995 non-consecutive 
Togo TGO 1992 consecutive 
Togo TGO 1993 consecutive 
Togo TGO 1994 non-consecutive 
Tunisia TUN 1987 consecutive 
Tunisia TUN 1988 consecutive 
Tunisia TUN 1989 non-consecutive 
Uganda UGA 1993 consecutive 
Uganda UGA 1994 consecutive 
Uganda UGA 1995 non-consecutive 
Uruguay URY 1985 consecutive 
Uruguay URY 1986 consecutive 
Uruguay URY 1987 non-consecutive 
South Africa ZAF 1993 consecutive 
South Africa ZAF 1994 consecutive 
South Africa ZAF 1995 non-consecutive 
Zambia ZMB 1991 consecutive 
Zambia ZMB 1992 consecutive, non-consecutive 
Zambia ZMB 1993 non-sustainable 
Zambia ZMB 2001 consecutive 
Zambia ZMB 2002 consecutive 
 
Notes: a (b) off support in full sample (non-sustainable treatment).  
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